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Abstract

Sustainable development still remains the best option to secure a viable future.

Why are some leaders more prone to implement sustainable development policies than

others, and does the leaders' political orientation affect such decision-making? Leaders

are often faced with constraints that make them choose policies that do not necessarily

lead to sustainability from an ecological point of view. This thesis addresses these issues

by examining two case studies that involve an analysis of the sustainable development

policies implemented by President Lula in Brazil and President Chavez in Venezuela and

the constraints that have hindered them in doing so.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction

The world population is growing at a rapid pace, with nine billion people

predicted to inhabit the Earth in 2050, which signify a continuous increase in the use and

abuse of the Earth's natural resources. The concern is not so much population growth

itself but how more and more people expect higher living standards that are demanding

more of the environment, without concern for a sustainable development. Successful

sustainable development is to balance the need for economic growth and social equity

against the need to protect the environment, while meeting the needs of the present

generation without compromising the needs of future generations. In theory, sustainable

development sounds like an easy option but it is more complex to put into practice.

This thesis examines whether leaders' political orientation influence their

propensity to implement sustainable development policies. It is worth mentioning that

this thesis focuses on individual leaders' political orientation rather than governments,

since in many countries, including Brazil, there are coalition governments consisting of

political parties with various ideological backgrounds. This thesis will specifically

explore how inclined

leftist'

leaders with populist tendencies are in implementing such

policies. In an attempt to answer this, the case selection involves President Luiz Inacio

2

Lula da Silva

in Brazil and President Hugo Frias Chavez' in Venezuela. Qualitative and

quantitative evidence of the policies implemented by President Lula since he was elected

I

A caveat is needed here. Leftism is a contentious term, since it is often perceived as intrinsically linked to
socialism, and in some countries, socialism has a very negative connotation. Some would also disagree to
use the same leftist definition for President Lula and President Chavez. There is a need to distinguish
between the degrees of these leaders' perceived leftism. On an ideological continuum, Lula is a moderate
leftist leader that can be placed towards the center-left, and Chavez is an extreme leftist leader that can be
�laced to the far-left on the continuum.
Thereafter refer to as Lula. Many would also argue that Lula is not a populist, though in chapter two his
fopulist tendencies will be established.
Thereafter refer to as Chavez.

4

in 2002, and the policy choices of President Chavez since his landslide win in

l 998 will

be analyzed. The hypothesis of this thesis is that if a leftist populist leader is faced with

public demands that can be overcome by short-term unsustainable solutions from an

ecological point of view, then the leader will sacrifice the long-term goals of sustainable

development.

Methodology

This thesis relies mainly on qualitative analyses and empirical evidence from a

broad range of academic papers, news articles and government information. In general,

measuring sustainable development is difficult because sustainable development policies

are often implemented across different sectors and ministries. It may also be challenging

to distinguish between policies that lead to long-term environmental sustainability and

policies that solve immediate problems that are not sustainable from an ecological point

of view. Sustainable development policies can be to make sure the population has access

to safe drinking water, to sustainable employment programs and waste recycling

measures. The United Nations Division for Sustainable Development has presented a set

of 60 indicators divided into four themes (social, environmental, economic and

institutional) to measure sustainable development." These sets of indicators are good

reference points but there will always be variations in the interpretations of how the

indicators fit within distinct government policies. This thesis will analyze policies that are

believed to lead to long-term sustainable development, where the objective of sustainable

4

For more information visit United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development,
http://www.un.org!esa/sustdev/natlinfo/indicators/isdms2001 /table_4 .htm
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development is obtaining a perfect balance between social equity, economic growth and

environmental protection. The analysis involves a framework that deals with the targets

separately in order to determine the success rate of the sustainable development policies

implemented by Chavez and Lula.

Brazil and Venezuela were chosen as case studies because the leaders share leftist

political orientation and populist tendencies, though at different points across an

ideological continuum. Lula can be placed to the center-left, while Chavez can be placed

to the far-left. The countries were also chosen since they are located within the same

region, share high levels of income inequality and skewed land distribution, and a history

of powerful oligarchies and ruling elites. Both countries host the Amazon rainforest

within their borders, in addition to have among the richest biodiversity in the world. The

presidents have been in power long enough so that it is possible to conduct a qualitative

analysis to give an indication of their policy choices, and to determine whether these

policies are contributing to long-term sustainable development from an ecological point

of view.

Leaders in general, and not only leftist populists, are often faced with constraints

that make them choose policies they often know can produce positive results in the short

term but not necessarily their policy of preference or policies that lead to environmental

sustainability. A wide variety of constraints have been identified and categorized into

political constraints, social constraints, and economic constraints. This thesis will

explicitly deal with the constraints that are perceived as most prevalent in hindering

Chavez and Lula in implementing sustainable development policies. The prevalent

constraints that also serve as independent variables will be presented in the respective

6

chapters on Brazil and Venezuela. Since there exist a wide range of constraints that can

hinder a leader in implementing policies, Table 1 identifies several other possible

constraints than only those that relate to the case studies.

Table 1 . Categorization of constraints

Political Constraints

Economic Constraints

Social Constraints

Populist tendencies

Public debt

Poverty

Institutional system

Inflation

Income inequality

Foreign policy

Budget restrictions

Lack of land rights

Political structure

Nature of global economy

Population size

Legacy of predecessors

Lack of foreign direct investment

Unemployment

Corruption

Currency

Public demands

Elite and corporate interests

Subsidization

Lack of infrastructure

Lobbying

Trade

Illiteracy

Electoral System

Informal sector employment

Gender inequality

Upcoming Elections

Taxation

Crime

Lax law enforcement

Privatization

Health status

Presidential power

High cost of capital

High energy use

Decentralization and local politics

High interest rates

Geographical size

International cooperation

External creditworthiness

Fear of coup d'etat

Export promotion
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Review of the literature

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development has been on thee agenda for nearly 20 years, from the

publication of the United Nations report "Our Common Future" 1 9 8 7 , to the Earth

Summit in Rio in 1992 and to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in

Johannesburg 2002. Scholars, development practitioners, governments, NGOs, grassroots

groups and economists have all discussed sustainable development from many angles.

Some leaders are more prone to implement sustainable development policies than others.

The purpose of this thesis is to establish whether leaders' political orientation affect their

propensity to do so. After reviewing the literature, it appears there has been little focus on

whether leaders' political orientation has any effect on their propensity to implement

sustainable development policies. After reviewing the literature, it appears that there has

been little focus on whether there is a correlation between leaders' political orientation

and the propensity to implement sustainable development policies.

Most scholars agree that sustainable development is an excellent concept in

theory but difficult to put into practice. M. Shamsul Haque is skeptical of governments

actually implementing sustainable development policies, since the leaders are all affected

by "individual prejudices, political predilections and vested economic interests.:" Robin

Sharp emphasizes more directly how governments are bound by their limited time in

power, and how they will choose short-term policies that will get them reelected; "jam

5

M. Shamsul Haque, "Environmental Discourse and Sustainable Development: linkages and limitations," Ethics and
Environment, Vol. 5 No. I , Elsevier Science Inc., (2000), 1 7 .

8

today will buy more votes than ovens for bread tornorrow.?" rather than planning long-

7

term.

Political orientation is not mentioned specifically but there seems to be widespread

agreement that democratic processes are required for sustainable development to be

9

8

successful,

which implies direct participation at all levels of society .

Thus, empowering

10

ordinary citizens is the only way forward to achieve sustainable development,

and the

people who will be impacted must assist in drafting the sustainable development policies

11

and not only expected to follow policies implemented from above.

Governments should

allow for such bottom-up approach that could be seen as a prerequisite for sustainable

development.

In order for developing countries to achieve sustainable development, Pearce and

Warford claim that they do not have to follow in the environmentally degrading

12

development footsteps of the North.

Developing countries should learn from past

experiences and choose development that does not lead to lost economic output over a

13

degraded environment and poor natural resource management.

Pursuing growth

strategies without assessing whether the same objectives can be achieved at less

6

Johan Holmberg, editor, "Making Development Sustainable: Redefining Institutions, Policy, and
Economics," International Institute for Environment and Development, Washington, D . C . : Island Press,
Washington D.C. and Covelo, California, (1992), 6 1 .
7

Holmberg, Making Development Sustainable, 37.
8

See Ibid.
9

David Barkin "Economic Integration versus Sustainable Development, " Prepared for the Conference on
Trade and Environment, Pacific Basin Research Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, April 29-30, (1994), 3.
I O Holmberg, Making Development Sustainable, 30.
11

Barkin, Economic Integration versus Sustainable Development, 4.
12

Here, the term "North" refers to developed countries, or what used to be perceived as the West when the
main dividing lines in the international system were between the East and the West. With the end of the
Cold War, this shifted to a North-South divide, where the North includes primarily North America, Europe,
Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
13

David Pearce and, Jeremy J. Warford "World without end: economics, environment and sustainable
development," World Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction, New York: Oxford University
Press, 1 9 9 3 .

9

environmental cost is not rational." Governments should therefore implement rules to

ensure that economic development occurs where actors set environmental protection as a

15

prerequisite for economic growth,

preferably as part of law. Unfortunately, there seems

to be a lack of political w i l l to do so. On the other hand, some believe the remedy for

achieving global sustainable development is that people of developed nations reduce their

16

consumption pattems.

That is highly unlikely because many do not see any moral

17

concerns regarding the extent of their ecological footprint.

Factors that are more likely

to actually impact individuals to reduce their consumption levels include tangible

measures such as soaring gas prices, high commodity prices, government taxes,

unemployment and inflation.

Governments should also be instrumental in redistributing wealth among their

citizens, reducing inequality, and hopefully thereby alleviating poverty, since it is widely

18

agreed that poverty and environmental degradation go hand in h an d .

Unfortunately, in

19

many countries the state is too poor to care for the basic needs of their citizens,

and the

long-term goal of sustainable development is not on top of the agenda. Since the poor are

1 4 Pearce and Warford,

World without end

15

Rosenberg.

Robin L . ,

Development,"

"Trade and the Environment: Economic Development versus Sustainable

Journal oflnteramerican Studies and World Affairs

36(3): (1994), 1 2 9 - 1 5 5 .

16

See Peter Bartelmus,

Sustainability,"

"Environment growth and development: The Concepts and Strategies o
f

London and New York: Routledge,

and David C. Korten,

48( I ) , (2005), 65-7 4,

Development,

(1994);

Holmberg,

Making Development Sustainable;

"Sustainable Development: Conventional versus emergent alternative wisdom, "
Society for International Development.

17

"The ecological footprint is a resource management tool that measures how much land and water area a
human population requires to produce the resources it consumes and to absorb its wastes under prevailing
technologies." Global Footprint Network,

"Ecological Footprint Overview,"

http://www.footprintnetwork.org/gfn _sub. php?content=footprint_ overview

18
See Barkin,

Environment,
Sustainable,

Economic Integration versus Sustainable Development,

Korten,

4 ; Rosenberg,

Conventional versus emergent alternative wisdom,

and Poverty-Environment Partnership,

Reduction, Environment/or the MDGs,

Holmberg,

Trade and the
Making Development

"Assessing Environment's Contribution to Poverty

" F ir s t Printing, September

(2005),

available at

http://www. undp .org/pei/pd fs/AssessingEnvironmentsRo leinPovertyReduction. pdf.
19

See Barkin,

Economic Integration versus Sustainable Development,

3.
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believed to be the first to suffer from environmental degradation.i" there is a tension

between how governments tend to adopt policies that are unsustainable from an

ecological point of view, as a short-term

way to improve the lives of the poor. Where this

is the case, the poor often become advocates of more environmentally resourceful

21

management.

To overcome this inconsistency in their policy choices, it must become

more natural for leaders and governments to embrace environmental protection as a

prerequisite for not only economic growth but also for policies that lead to social

progress.

Populism

Much has been written on populism and populist leaders, from issues of classical

22

populism,

23

to neo-populism,

24

and from macroeconomic populism

25

to petro populism.

There seems to be consensus that a populist leader has a charismatic personality, and as a

result he has mass appeal. Historically, populist leaders have opened the political arena to

broader citizen participation that included giving marginalized groups the legal right to

20

See Korten, Conventional versus emergent alternative wisdom, 65-74.
21

See Korten Conventional versus emergent alternative wisdom, 65-74.
22

See Taggart, Populism.
23

See Kurt Weyland, "Neopopulism and Neolibertalism in Latin America: How much Affinity?" Paper for
Panel on Neopopulism in Latin America: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues@ XXIV International
Congress, Latin American Studies Association, Dallas, Texas, (March 2003); and Rene Antonio Mayorga,

"Outsider and Neopopulism: The Road to Plebiscitarian Authoritarianism," Paper submitted to the
Conference "The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes," Kellogg Institute for International
Affairs, University ofNotre Dame. May 1 3 - 1 4 , 2002.
24

See Yasmine Coupal, "Macroeconomic Populism in Venezuela," Stanford University, (May 2003),
available at http://www-econ.stanford.edu/academics/Honors _Theses/Theses _2003/Coupal.pdf; and
Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, editors, "The Macroeconomic of Populism in Latin America,"
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 9 1 .
25

Christian Parenti," Hugo Chavez and Petro Populism," The Nation, March 24, 2005,
http://www.thenation.com/doc/200504 l l/parenti,

1 1

26

vote. There is no clear consensus to whether populism constitutes an ideology

or

whether it is a political philosophy. Since classical populism and neo-populism span

across governments that are leftist and conservative, populism cannot constitute a

separate ideology and this thesis will therefore not treat it as such.

Populist actions are often reactions to domestic demands from the masses. A head

of state that governs following a populist program is therefore likely to implement

policies to please the masses that want to see sudden change. As a result, the leaders will

choose policies that give immediate results. That is not synonymous with sustainability.

To give people money to buy food will give short-term immediate food security but

without investing in and overcoming what is actually causing the food shortage, will not

promote sustainable development. In general much is said about populists and the

implementation of social and economic policies, though little is mentioned about how a

populist would respond to environmental policies. This thesis will attempt to fill that gap

in the literature.

The unequal distribution of resources is believed by many to be part of what has

brought populists to power. Populism is about empowering and representing the masses,

and the populist leader portrays himselr" as being one of the people against the elite.

Populist leaders have also been thought to undermine government institutions and

28

democratic rule,

since populism as defined by Kenneth Roberts," is perceived to thrive

29

under and exacerbate conditions of institutional fragility."

By 2005, many fear a

26

Mayorga, Outsider and Neopopulism,

1-27.

27

This thesis refers to the populist leader as male because in the Latin American context the majority of
�opulist leaders have been men.
8

Kirk Hawkins, "Populism in Venezuela: the rise of Chavismo," Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 6,
Carfax Publishing, Taylor and Francis Group, (2003), 1 1 3 7 - 1 1 6 0 .
29

Kenneth Roberts, "Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America: A

12

resurgence of populism in Latin America," which is perceived a threat to democracy in

the region. There are differences between Chavez's populism." also referred to as

32

Chavismo

and more moderate populists such as President Lula in Brazil. Kurt Weyland

claims that populism and neo-liberalism are compatible and that neo-liberal populism

33

remains a viable strategy in present-day Latin America.

On the other hand, if populists

are a threat to democracy, and since democracy is believed to be a prerequisite for

successful sustainable development, populism may tum out to be a net negative for

sustainable development. The analysis of the case studies will establish whether this is

the case.

Policy significance

Establishing whether leaders' political orientation affect their propensity to

implement sustainable development policies, and highlighting the constraints that may

play a decisive role, have policy significance since it would give decision makers better

insight in how to improve their sustainable development agenda, and at the same time

give voters a better understanding of the actual priorities of different leaders. This thesis

is also very timely because of the current political trend in Latin America toward leftist

governments and the upcoming 2006 elections across the region where many of the leftist

candidates are favored to win. There is also widespread international skepticism towards

Comparison o
f Fujimori and Chavez," Department of PoliticalScience, University of New Mexico, 3,

available at http://falcon.arts.comell.edu/Govt/faculty/Roberts.populism.05.comparative.politics.pdf.
30

See Steve C. Ropp "The Strategic Implications o
f the Rise o
f Populism in Europe and South America,"
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), June 2005, available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB605.pdf, and Sebastian Edwards, "Will Latin
America take the populist path?" Anderson Graduate School of Management at UCLA, (October 1 6 ,

2002,) available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/sebastian.edwards/LatinPopulism_Final.pdf.
31

Mayorga, Outsider and Neopopulism,

1-21.

32

Hawkins, Populism in Venezuela, 1 1 3 7 - 1 1 6 0 .
33

Weyland, Neopopulism and Neoliberalism,

1-22.
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leftist governments and especially leftist populist leaders. Providing a better

understanding of how leftist leaders with populist tendencies implement sustainable

development policies might actually change how they are perceived. Finally, this thesis

may provide an understanding of how demands for economic growth can be better

incorporated into the concept of sustainable development, thereby making economic

development "green."

Sustainable Development Policies

Sustainable development is a complex concept that received international

recognition and was put into force in "Our Common Future" in 1 9 8 7 . Here, sustainable

development was defined as "development that meets the needs of the present without

34

compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."

Theoretically,

it is easy to understand the importance of sustainable development but that does not

imply that it is easy to put into practice. For this reason, it is important to clarify the

ideals of sustainable development. In its simplest form, sustainable development is about

improving people's quality of life, while preserving natural resources for future

generations. This signifies a continuous pursuit of development, both economic and

social, while at the same time protecting the environment. The stated goal is "the

improvement of human wellbeing and more equitable distribution of resources across. and

within

societies.t''"

34

World Commission on Environment and Development,

"Our Common Future," New York: Oxford

University Press, May 1 9 8 7 .
35

Chris Sneddon, Richard B. Howarth, and Richard B Norgaard, "Sustainable development in a post

Brundtland world", Ecological Economics xx (2005) xxx-xxx, Science Direct, 2005.
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There is now widespread recognition that there is a connection between poverty

and environmental destruction. Poverty is seen as the greatest enemy of the environment

because it forces both people and governments into opting for short-term economic

37

36

goals,

thereby creating a vicious circle of poverty and environmental degradation.

This circle is what sustainable development is attempting to overcome. Poor people are

dependent on natural resources, not only for food but also as their primary source of

income. As a result, achieving poverty alleviation requires a healthy environment.

Unfortunately, many governments that adhere to nee-liberal economic policies will

choose economic growth over concerns for the environment. Such economic policies lead

to immediate revenue but as the environment is placed under continued stress, policies

that are not ecologically sustainable may not present future long-term revenue. That is not

to say that all economic growth is unsustainable, as long as economic policies place

38

environmental protection as prerequisite for growth.

Sustainable development was also

the main theme at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 culminating in the

Agenda 2 1 , which constitutes a proposal on how to execute sustainable development

policies. Brazil is implementing its own national sustainable development strategy, the

39

Brazilian Agenda 2 1 , whereas Venezuela does not yet have one.

The gist of Brazilian

Agenda 2 1 relates to finding the perfect balance between environmental protection, social

36

Short-term economic goals can be anything from economic liberalization, irresponsible redistribution
from an ecological point of view, or depleting natural resources.
37

Rosenberg. Trade and the Environment. 129.
38

Ibid.
39

Europe, North America and Australia are implementing national sustainable development strategies in
addition to some Asian nations. The only country apart from Brazil that is implementing a national strategy
in South America is Ecuador. Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are currently developing their
national sustainable development strategies. United Nations, "National Development Strategies: The

Global Picture," (updated December 1 , 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/natlinfo/nsds/nsds_Map2006.pdf.
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equity, and economic growth. The main goal for any sustainable development policy is

overcoming trade-offs between these different targets. The relationship between the three

targets will depend on the policies adopted. This relationship will become more evident

in the analysis of the situation in Brazil and Venezuela. Before exploring the policies

implemented by President Lula and President Chavez, it is important to introduce

previous populist leaders in Latin America, and how their experiences may have shaped

the populist leaders of today.

Outline

In chapter two, the existing theories of populism are presented in a general

analysis that focuses on the history of populist leaders in Latin America, and specifically

previous presidents with populist tendencies in Brazil and Venezuela. In chapter three

sustainable development policies implemented by President Lula will be analyzed

including the constraints that prevent him in prioritizing or choosing such policies.

Chapter four will include a similar analysis of the sustainable development policies

chosen by President Chavez in Venezuela. In chapter five, the performance of the leaders

will be outlined including the constraints that have been most prevalent in preventing

successful implementation of sustainable development policies.

Chapter 2. Populism

There is no accepted definition on populism, though some factors are frequently

associated with it. The populist leader is charismatic; he has mass appeal and he

16

challenges the status quo. Populism is not restricted to one particular ideology but is

apparent in left, center and right-leaning leaders. Populism is a disputed political

philosophy, which as Julia Buxton sees as a "highly negative, extremist development or

40

alternatively as a force for progress and reform."

As a force for progress, populism is

41

known to open the political scene to a wider variety of political actors.

Populist leaders

42

also promise to reform societies to improve the lives of these actors,

something

traditional politicians are believed to have generally ignored. In return for political

support, the populist leaders will reward voters with policies that are favorable to their

43

subjective interests, such as the right to unionize or access to welfare systems.

In order

to do so, the populist has been known to redistribute resources. For these reasons the

populist leaders are often very popular, which accounts for President Lula's election in

Brazil and President Chavez's ability to stay in power for almost eight years in

Venezuela.

The main criticism against populism is that it is believed to cause "institutional

underdevelopment", since populist leaders have not been known to favor strong

institutions that would limit their power." Populism has therefore been regarded as a

threat to democracy. As a result many scholars believe that populism is incompatible with

45

democracy.

It is worth noting that there is a contention regarding different

40

Julia Buxton, "Hugo Chavez and Populist Continuity in Venezuela," Department of Social Sciences,
Kingston University, Paper for the Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference, London
tpril 2000), I .
I

An example is how President Betancourt introduced universal voting in Venezuela. Fransisco Panizza,
editor,

"Populism and the Mirror of Democracy," (Verso 2005), 1 1 .

42

Michael L. Conniff, Populism in Latin America," The University of Alabama Press, ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 5 .
43

Buxton, Hugo Chavez and Populist Continuity in Venezuela, I .
44

Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, ( editors), "The Macroeconomic of Populism in Lalin
America," University of Chicago Press, ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 1 6 8 .
45

Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomic of Populism in Latin America, 1 5 2 .

17

interpretations of democracy. The "Western" interpretation of representative democracy

does not necessarily function in all societies and cultures and some, including President

Chavez, believe that the Rosseauian model of direct democracy that favors strong

46

leadership and weaker institutions is more adequate and effective.

Some scholars have focused particularly on populists and their economic

47

policies,

since the most contentious issue regarding the success rate of populist leaders

has been their choices of such policies. These economic policies have often been

perceived as irresponsible because of a tendency to overspend, eventually ending up

draining state resources. Evidence shows that many of the populist leaders in Latin

America did indeed overspend. This is a trait that some recognize in Chavez's economic

policies. Julia Buxton argues that reckless spending is why most populist governments

fail, and why the Chavez government wi l l not prevail." The purpose of overspending by

populist leaders has often been seen as positive, since substantial resources are usually

spent on social programs and improving the lives of the marginalized in society.

Unfortunately, a government that is spending above its means while ignoring fiscal

deficits and decreasing foreign exchange reserves will eventually be held accountable.

That is not to say that no populist can control their spending but with institutional

weaknesses that are often prevalent where a populist is in power, there are few checks

46

Howard J. Wiarda, "Democracy in Latin America: Crises and Opportunity,"
Latham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., (2005), I 0 6 - 1 0 7 .
47

In 1 9 9 1 , Dornbusch and Edwards set forth a paradigm of economic populism based on the assumption
that populism emphasizes growth and income redistribution, and deemphasizes macroeconomic policies
such as risks of inflation and deficit finance. The authors warn that populist policies ultimately fail with
large costs to the people they were supposed to be helping. The authors argue that this is the case even
though populists implement ambitious economic programs aimed at "redistributing income, generating
employment and accelerating growth." Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in

Latin America, 9.
48

Buxton, Hugo Chavez and Populist Continuity in Venezuela.
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and balances that can monitor the expenditures of the government, and deter the economy

from entering into recession.

There has been a tendency to focus primarily on whether the populist leader can

achieve economic growth in real numbers, while the literature fails to truce into

consideration other achievements that contribute to the wellbeing of a nation and its

people. If the focus is instead on sustainable development as a prerequisite for drafting

economic policies, which include social progress and environmental sustainability, in

addition to economic growth, it may be that populist economic policies are not always

doomed to fail.

Populism in Latin America

In recent years there has been a trend towards democratically elected leftist

leaders with populist tendencies in the Latin American region that have gathered support

from the masses by declaring himself as one of them. The leftist populist leader promises

to improve their quality of life, something that predecessors and the opposition have been

reluctant to, or incapable of accomplishing. President Lula may be considered the

moderate leftist leader in Latin America, and President Chavez is perceived as far-left

along the lines of Cuban President Fidel Castro. Other leftist leaders include Tabare

Vazquez who was elected president of Uruguay in 2004 and Evo Morales who was

elected president of Bolivia in 2005. Ollanta Humala won the first round in the 2006

presidential elections in Peru and is predicted to win the second round, and the former

Mayor of Mexico City, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, a populist leftist candidate, is
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predicted to win the 2006 presidential election in Mexico. This leftist trend

may be a

result of common problems facing these countries.i" and past unsuccessful experiences

with conservative nee-liberal governments.

Populism in 2o•h century Latin America

1

During the 20

h

century, Latin American populist leaders shared aspirations of

"national economic independence, breaking semi-feudal structures and promoting social

justice that included improving the quality of life for those that had been regarded as

insignificant by previous leaders.Y' The populist leaders were able to win elections

mainly because of rapid urbanization when millions of rural poor people moved to the

cities as a result of industrialization. Unfortunately, social programs did not expand at the

52

same rate and slums emerged in cities all across the region,

widening further the gap

between rich and poor. Famous Latin American populists include authoritarian presidents

Getulio Domelles Vargas in Brazil and Juan Peron in Argentina, socialist President

53

Salvador Allende in Chile and nee-liberal President Alberto Fujimori in Peru.

The region's history of economic instability and hyperinflation has convinced most

49
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a military coup to overthrow him and Peron was overthrown.
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governments of the need to emphasize macroeconomic prudence. This has created a new

generation of populist leaders that "believe they need to have an open economy in order

to develop econornically.t''" Leaders that demonstrate classical populism and at the same

55

time embrace neo-liberal market reforms are referred to as neo-populists.

Populism in Brazil

The right-leaning dictator Getulio Vargas is regarded as the first populist leader in

56

Brazil.

The 1 9 3 0 revolution that brought him to power saw the downfall of the

oligarchy in Brazil, and was a sign of economic change involving modernization,

57

centralization and import-substitution industrialization ( I S i ) ,

which lead to massive

migration from the countryside and the creation of a new large urban worker class.

President Vargas wanted to improve their situation by distributing resources more

broadly and implementing social legislation. Despite little documented efforts to actually

improve their quality oflife, Vargas' use of pro-labor rhetoric in continuous radio

58

speeches and public appearances created an image of him as the "father of the poor."

Because of this rhetoric, Vargas became highly unpopular with the elites that resented the

President's integration of the urban worker class into the political system, since it would

cause them to lose political control.
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The reason for his demise involved his economic policies. Vargas introduced

interventionist economic models that included excessive regulation and nationalization,

which according to Dornbusch and Edwards "distorted the allocation of resources and

59

negatively affected potential output."

Instead of addressing the issue of wealth

distribution directly, populists chose to print money to keep people content in the short-

60

term,

which contributed to a legacy of inflation that continues to be a common

challenge facing governments throughout the region today.

The rule of populist leaders in Brazil ended with the military coup in 1964 that was

61

set off by massive rural political mobilization.

After return to civilian rule in 1 9 8 5 , the

masses regained political representation through neo-populist candidates such as former

President Fernando Collor de Mello and President Lula. Collor de Mello attained office

62

in a typical populist manner by appealing to unorganized masses.

He restructured the

economy following a market-oriented model but failed to control inflation. This caused

economic recession that ended in massive public outcry resulting in his impeachment on

corruption charges in 1 9 9 2 .

President Lula is usually defined as a moderate leader with a socialist background

that has turned more to the center of the ideological continuum after coming to power. To

63

some he is now even perceived as conservative.

Lula is less frequently referred to as a

populist than Chavez but he did demonstrate populist tendencies during his election
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campaign when he strategically targeted the poor voters with promises of poverty

alleviation by implementing comprehensive social programs. He also promised to end

corruption and thereby changing the status quo. In a country where voting is obligatory

by law, the poor constitute a large part of the voting mass, and by specifically using pro-

poor rhetoric and portraying himself as one of them, Lula became the representative of

the poor. A few months before the election, Lula realized that his voting base would not

get him reelected and he pledged to continue the neo-liberal economic policies that were

already in place. Since then, Lula's populist tendencies were diluted. Now that the

economy is restored, Lula again reveals his populist tendencies and has promised massive

spending on social programs, which may be the winning strategy to get reelected in

December 2006.

Populism in Venezuela

President Chavez is a classical populist but he is not the first populist in

64

Venezuela. President R6mulo Betancourt

became the provisional president after a

military coup in 1 9 4 5 , which was led by representatives of worker and peasant

organizations. Betancourt supported the same policies as Vargas of rapid modernization

and centralization. He implemented interventionist policies to assume control of the oil

industry as part of his support for nationalization. The government collected half of the

profits generated by o i l companies, which allowed President Betancourt to allocate ten

65

percent of the federal budget to the Venezuelan Development Corporation.

The

64

President Betancourt served two terms as president on behalf of the Democratic Action Party, from 1 9 4 5
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65

It was created to protect domestic industry from foreign competition.
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President's Democratic Action Party presented a political platform referred to as the

Trienio legacy that included introducing universal suffrage and widespread social

reforms. The fundamental ideas of the Trienio legacy are still existing in Venezuela today

in the form of direct and secret voting; agrarian reform; free universal free education;

nationalization of the oil industry, and extensive public spending on social programs.

Another similarity between Betancourt and Chavez is the highly centralized political

structure and strict measures against internal opposition. President Betancourt is famous

for his use of sharp language, and his political party is legendary for transforming

66

political discourse in Venezuela.

President Chavez uses the same speaking style in his

weekly talk show "Alo Presidente," and he has also continued the Democratic Action

67

Party's glorification of Latin America's liberator, Simon Bolivar.

Populist leaders are highly responsive to their constituency. If the voters want

immediate results, the populist leader is likely to cater for such demands and not

necessarily take into account environmental sustainability unless it is a specific demand

from the public. As an example, social policies may indeed feed people but not always be

as pragmatic, since the quest for immediate results is short-term and does not necessarily

create long-term improvements. Whether populist tendencies act as constraints to the

implementation of sustainable development policies in Brazil and Venezuela will be

addressed below.
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C h a p t e r 3 : Brazil

68

Brazil is a Federative Republic

where Brazilian politicians, serving as national

69

legislators, are believed to favor state and municipal interests over national interests.

As

a result of the highly decentralized political system it is difficult for a president to

implement top-down national policies, including sustainable development policies, to be

embraced on the local level. Brazil has a highly fragmented multi-party system with more

than ten political parties represented in Congress. The Lula government does not control

Congress and must create and maintain coalitions to get things done. People and

politicians are not party conscious, so that, in a typical four-year Congress period, more

70

than one in three federal legislators will switch parties, some more than once.

As a

result the system is highly unpredictable because it is not easy to know where alliances

lie. This volatility and the close impossibility of controlling majority in Congress

constitute major constraints on the president's ability to implement policies. This is not a

new problem in Brazilian politics, and previous presidents have also struggled with these

challenges.

The Lula Era

President Lula's background is similar to his constituency. He comes from a

working class family with little formal education. He worked his way up in life as a metal

68
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worker to become president of the Steel Worker's union in 1 9 7 8 , and moved on to a

political career in 1 9 8 2 representing the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-

71

PT).

After three failed attempts at the presidency, Lula hired the marketing guru Duda

Mendonca to revamp his image in the 2002 campaign. Lula went from coming across as a

laborer to portraying a softer image looking smart in fancy suits, and adopting the slogan

72

"Lula, Peace and Love".

The image change appealed to a broader electorate including

the middle class and business people. Lula's main election promises to improve income

distribution and alleviate poverty still appealed mostly to the poor. Out of fear of losing

votes from the business community and the middle class, two months before the election,

Lula issued a "Letter to the Brazilian people," where he reiterated his intention to respect

73

existing economic commitments.

President Lula was no longer perceived as the radical

"leftie" and was able to form alliances across the political board" that won him the

presidential election in 2002. During his first years in power, the economic policies

showed little influence of leftism This disappointed Lula's supporters but pleased his

opponents, who apparently had feared the collapse of the Brazilian economy. The people

who voted Lula into power had large expectations of him to be the first president that

would actually represent the poor. They believed he would be able to combine monetary

71
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stability with social policies as set forth in the "Buenos Aires Consensus," thereby

75

offering a real alternative to neo-liberalism.

The perception of Lula as a moral man is believed to have helped him win the

76

election.

However, this perception was distorted by a large-scale political scandal

within his Workers' Party in 2005. The scandal involves allegations that Workers' Party

officials used illicit cash to pay for the Party's campaigns and to buy loyalty from

congressional allies. The scandal extended all the way up to the President's chief advisor,

Jose Dirceu, who had to resign. In March 2006, the Minister of Finance, Antonio Palocci,

77

also had to step down over corruption charges,

and there is disagreement whether Lula

was aware of what was going on. The scandal is obviously affecting Lula's popularity,

78

though he is still slightly leading the polls ahead of the election in October 2006.

Sustainable Development

Former President Cardoso signed Brazilian Agenda 2 1 in July 2002 in preparation

of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg. The Brazilian

Agenda 2 1 is now part of the Government's Pluriannual Plan (PPA) 2004-2007 where

national expenditures are drafted, and it has become a key instrument in creating public
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policies. The objective of the Brazilian Agenda 2 1 is finding a perfect balance between

economic growth, social equity and environmental protection achieved through natural

resource management and conservation, social inclusion and income distribution. Local

Agenda 2 1 policy papers have been drafted throughout the country bringing together

government, private sector and civil society. Unfortunately, policy papers do not create

action by themselves, and strong leadership and political will on national and local levels

are needed to make sustainable development happen.

Constraints

Not all constraints that were identified in Table 1 are relevant in the case study of

Brazil." The main constraints hindering Lula in implementing sustainable development

policies are political in nature. An example is the political structure, which creates

coalition governments that will not always agree on policies. When the coalition

government lacks majority in Congress, it is challenging for a president to get support for

his policies. The other major prevalent constraints facing Lula are identified in Table 2.

The effects of these constraints on the implementation of sustainable development

policies will become apparent in the following empirical analysis.
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Table 2. Prevalent constraints that hinder Lula in implementing sustainable
development policies in Brazil

Political Constraints

Economic Constraints

Social Constraints

Political and institutional

Public debt

Poverty

Budget restrictions

Income inequality

Upcoming elections

External creditworthiness

Skewed land distribution

Lax law enforcement

Export promotion

Lack of land reform

structure
Decentralization and local
politics

Elite and corporate interests

Geographical area

Foreign Direct Investment

Lobbying

High interest rates

Presidential power

High cost of capital

Population size

Corruption

Legacy of predecessor

Social Equity

The firmly established inequality is still among Brazil's greatest challenges.i''

This social inequality involves skewed income and land distribution that serve as major

constraints to the effectiveness of Lula's implementation of sustainable development

policies. With a Gini coefficient of 5 9 . 7 in 2004, Brazil has not only the highest

81

inequality in the region but is among the worst in the world.
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Social Programs

President Lula started his term in 2003 by implementing social programs such as

Fame Zero (Zero Hunger) that aims at eradicating hunger by providing three meals a day

for the 44 million eligible people of the nation's poor. President Lula continued by

introducing Balsa Familia (Family Fund), which consolidates four social programs

operated by several ministries, now controlled under the Ministry of Social Development.

Balsa Familia attempts to give families the means to leave poverty and will pay up to $ 3 3

a month to the poorest families. Participation in the program is contingent on parental

responsibilities that include attending regular health check-ups and receiving necessary

vaccinations, in addition to ensuring adequate levels of nutrition, and school participation

for all children. Internationally, Balsa Familia is perceived as a good example of a new

generation of social programs termed "conditional cash transfers" (CCTs), and has

82

received $572 million from the World Bank to expand and improve.

On the other hand,

the program has faced criticism since some people will be content living on the small

benefit they receive, which may cause dependency rather than sustainability. Overall, the

poor are positive towards Bolsa Familia and more than 9 million families are already

83

benefiting from the program.

More recipients are expected since the government has

promised to allocate more funds to social projects. In 2005, social spending increased by

84

$3 billion to $7.4 billion in 2005, with the goal of reaching $ 9 . 5 billion in 2006.

To
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further improve the situation of the poor, the government has also raised the minimum

wage.

85

Overcoming poverty and inequality in Brazil requires long-term investment. The

initiatives that Lula has introduced so far are promising and can lead to improved

outcomes in school attendance and nutritional and health status in the coming years.

Land Reform

Land reform is an important issue to Lula's constituency, and important to

achieve sustainable development. Brazil has a highly skewed landownership where only

86

three percent of Brazil's population controls 66 percent of the land.

A well-monitored

land reform system may lead to environmental sustainability since less people will

illegally chop down forest to get land. Putting this into action has not been as easy

because of resistance from landowners and the delay in creating a thorough land title

registry. One of the most powerful interest groups in Brazil, the Landless Workers'

87

Movement (MST) demands sustainable agrarian reforms

and has successfully pressured

88

the government to agree to settle a total of 400,000 families by the end of 2006.

The

dilemma is that sustainable land reform is expensive and will continue to require a
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significant role for the government, which is a challenge for any government. The Lula

government does not control Congress, and its broad-based coalition includes political

parties that have historically been against agrarian reform, which makes it close to

impossible for the President to fulfill MST demands. In an attempt to introduce

sustainable land reforms as demanded by the MST, the government's family agriculture

program (Pronaf) guaranteed to assist over 800,000 rural inhabitants with credit and

research. The intent is good, and with more extensive law enforcement that ensures

environmental protection, it may lead to long-term sustainable development.

Economic Growth

89

From 2003 to 2005, Brazil ran record trade surpluses,

primarily as a result of an

increase in exports of agricultural products. Inflation has been moderate; wages are

90

rising, while unemployment was 8 . 3 percent in December 2005.

Brazil still remains

vulnerable to sudden shifts in the world economy, mainly due to the government's public

debt that increased steadily from 1994 to 2003, before falling to 5 1 . 6 percent of GDP in

91

December 2005.

The public debt is still high and will continue to pose a constraint on

whether the Lula government will be able to implement sustainable development policies.

Many of L u l a ' s left-wing supporters believed that he would renegotiate Brazil's

foreign loans and at the same time revamp the economic system to foster more economic
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growth. This way the government would have enough money to implement social

policies, while at the same time preserve Brazil's rich environment. The Lula government

92

inherited an economy that was under-performing

and saw no other alternative than to

continue the economic policies of his predecessor President Fernando Henrique

93

Cardoso.

Lula staffed key economic posts with bankers and people of the previous

government to restore confidence in the economy, since lost creditworthiness implies lost

foreign direct investment and lost government revenue. The Central Bank increased

interest rates to become among highest in the world to attract foreign investment and

force inflation down. At the same time these measures caused massive unemployment

and slow economic growth, and are still constraining Lula in achieving policy goals.

The Minister of Finance, Antonio Palocci reaffirmed the agreement with the

International Monetary Fund (IMF), and set debt repayments at 4.25 percent of GDP,

even higher than IMF demands. Lula further introduced budget cuts, which affected most

government programs including social ones. These stringent economic measures

increased Lula's popularity abroad, and in conservative circles, but not among his

constituency. This perception may change since Lula's strategy has actually created

macroeconomic stability. In December 2005, President Lula announced the early

94

repayment of Brazil's debt to the IMF and the Paris Club totaling $ 1 8 . 1 billion.

The

government can finally control its own spending, which includes more flexibility to

invest in infrastructure and social projects that were ignored under IMF restraints. With
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$ 1 billion in saved interest costs, Lula has already promised more funds to Bolsa Familia

and land reform.

Despite the recorded slow economic growth, the prognosis is improved economic

performance. There Economist Intelligence Unit is predicting a 2006 economic growth at

3 . 4 percent compared to 2.3 percent in 2005, and continued healthy macroeconomic

95

indicators despite economic fluctuations in relations to the 2006 elections.

With

restored economic stability, President Lula is seeking free trade agreements with India

and South Africa and closer economic ties with China, which may attract more

investment and higher export growth. With a new finance minister, Guido Mantega, in

place that is more open to massive spending on social programs than his predecessor, the

current spending spree may continue." This can be an effective strategy to attract votes

before the election in 2006.

The International Monetary Fund's World Economic

Outlook is also projecting economic stability for Brazil with improved inflation rates,

purchasing power parity growth per capita, though a slight recession in the current

account balance.
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The current spending has increased by 25 percent during the first two months of 2006 compared with the
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Table 3. Economic Outlook Brazil

Subject Description

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

-l.7

0.8

l.9

l.8

l

0.2

7642.206

7726.59

8201.907

8584.371

8964.234

9355.983

8.4

14.8

6.6

6.9

4.9

4.4

Current account
balance in percent of
GDP, ratio
(PPP) per capita
GDP,

US$ in units

Inflation, annual
percent change

Source: International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database," (April 2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2006/0 I /data/index.htm

Environmental Protection

97

Environmental protection is a hot topic in Brazilian politics.

The importance of

Brazil's natural wealth is even acknowledged in the 1 9 8 8 Constitution where a full

98

section is devoted to the environment.

Brazil also has some of the strictest

99

environmental legislation in the world,

and the government gives the impression that·

100

there is no such thing as impunity from environmental crimes.

Many people were

optimistic regarding Lula's choice of Minister of the Environment, Marina Silva, who

101

grew up in the Amazon, fought alongside Chico Mendes,

and would personally

understand the importance of preserving the environment even when that conflicts with
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Brazil is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
and the Convention on Biological Diversity, Agenda 2 1 and the Forest Principles adopted at the 1992 Rio
Conference.
98

Article 225 reads that all have the right to an ecologically balanced environment, which is an asset of
common use and essential to a healthy quality of life.

Both the Government and the community shall have

the duty to defend and preserve the environment for present and future generations.
99
The Congress approved a law in 2003 on access to environmental information, which makes it
mandatory that all public agencies, to make all relevant information regarding environmental protection
public. Under the law, all state agencies must produce annual reports on air and water quality. See the
Federative Republic of Brazil Constitution, "Chapter VI, article 225, Environment, Title VJ/I- Social
Order," http://webthes.senado.gov. br/web/const/const88 .pdf.
J OO

The Environmental Crimes Law was introduced in 1 9 9 8 . Under the new law, activities that damage the

environment can be imposed with penalties ofup to $50 million and stricter sentences.
1 0 1 Chico Mendes was a rubber tapper and environmental activist that fought to stop logging in the
Amazon rainforest. He was murdered

in 1 9 8 8 by ranchers who opposed his ideals.
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economic growth. The Minister has sought to strengthen the coordination of

envirorunental policies across federal and state agencies, emphasizing a model that

promotes the social inclusion of the millions of Brazil's poor. President Lula also claims

that the government is working forcefully to establish envirorunental policies that are

economically and ecologically sustainable such as giving poor people an alternative

income source to discontinue envirorunental degradation. The constraints facing the

government in doing this successfully include lack of law enforcement to hinder illegal

deforestation, lack of an adequate land registry, corporate interests and lobbying against

envirorunental legislation.

Between 2004 and February 2006, President Lula implemented decrees that protect

nearly 1 4 . 5 million hectares of Amazon rainforest, an area the size of Nepal. In March

2006, President Lula also signed a new forest law aimed at combating deforestation,

102

which, according to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF),

is expected to help end illegal

land occupation in the Amazon, which is regarded as an important contributor to

deforestation. The government is also introducing initiatives that tie financing to

compliance with envirorunental laws where government banks must veto projects that do

not have an environmental license. This initiative is expected to include the private sector

in the near future. According to Amazon Institute of People and the Envirorunent,

landowners are obliged to protect riparian forests and conserve 80 percent of forest cover
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on their properties as legal reserves under Brazilian law.

The problem is the lack of

resources to monitor whether this is actually respected.
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World Wildlife Fund,

"New forest law in Brazil helps save the Amazon," (March 7, 2006),

hrJ'://www.panda.org/news_facts/newsroom/index.cfm?uNewsID=62760.
IO

Paulo Barreto and others, Human Pressure on the Brazilian Amazon Forests," Imazon: Amazon

institute of People and the Environment, Global Forest Watch and World Resources Institute, (March 2006)
available at http://pubs.wri.org/pubs _description.cfm?PubID=3 869.
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Renewable Energy

As a result of the oil crisis in the 1980s, Brazilian leaders realized the need for

diversification in the country's energy sources. Today, the government has the ambition

1 04

of becoming the world's leading nation in the production of biofuels.

The government

sees this as a great export opportunity and a good source of income. A global biofuel

economy may be under way, where Brazil is taking the lead. The government has already

landed biofuel trade deals with Japan and is actively negotiating deals with China.

Biofuel is believed to provide a clean and sustainable energy alternative that reduces

greenhouse gas emissions, though there is concern that the expansion of this sector will

exacerbate deforestation to be able to grow more crops.

Agribusiness and environmental sustainability

105

Brazil is among the largest exporters of beef,

and poultry

soybean, coffee, orange juice, sugar

in the world. Agribusiness is the only export to produce a surplus and

accounts for 34 percent of Brazil's GDP, 37 percent of all jobs nationwide and represents

43 percent of national exports.l'" Unfortunately, the most important exports, soybean and

meat production provide incentives for new highways and infrastructure projects and

104

Brazil has set out on a 30-year quest to substitute imported o i l with fuels made from crops. Along with
biomass, hydroelectricity, wind and solar power generation, ethanol should sustain rural electrification
projects throughout the country. About a third of the fuel Brazilians use in their vehicles is ethanol and
more than 80 percent of new cars sold in Brazil are equipped to use both ethanol and gasoline. With record
high gas prices, ethanol is a viable alternative not only out of environmental concerns but also from an
economic perspective.
I 05 According to the government, Brazil has the largest cattle herd in the world of 1 9 8 million animals in
2005, compared to 26 million in 1990. Caruso, Emily, "Roads of Deforestation in Brazil: how soya and

cattle are destroying the Amazon with the help of the IFC," World Rainforest Movement, WRM's bulletin

N° 93, (April 2005), http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/93/Brazil.html.
106

Brazilian agribusiness exports broke a new record and reached US$ 43.6 billion in 2005, which is an
annual increase of 1 1 . 8 percent. Brazilian Government,
http://www. bras ii.gov. br/ingles/about

"The Rural Explosion,"

brazil/indicators/cat_ agri/ categoria_view.
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have caused deforestation of 80 m i l l i o n hectares of land, which is roughly equivalent to

107

1 0 percent of Brazil's total area.

Brazilian history demonstrates that destruction of the

rainforest is inextricably linked to road building'l" and there is evidence that this is

continuing since 85 percent of all deforestation occurs within 50 km on either side of

109

roads.

Despite this knowledge, the government has agreed to build Highway B R - 1 6 3

between two important cities in the Amazon region, Santarem and Mato G r o s s o , ' : " and

has opened the project to private funding to speed up the construction process. The so-

111

called "Soybean Highway"

will greatly facilitate and increase exports in agriculture.

This is eminent for the economy but at the same time the highway is predicted to cause

further deforestation; increase violent land conflicts; and threaten the existence of

indigenous tribes residing in the area.

It does not help that the world's largest individual soy producer, Blairo Maggi, is

112

currently the governor of Mato Grosso,

where 50 percent of the total deforestation in

2005 took place including most of the land grabbing and land conflicts. In 2002, during

his first year as governor the deforestation rates increased by 30 percent in Mato Grosso.

There is clearly a conflict of interest present here. Maggi has publicly uttered his

disinterest in deforestation; emphasized his support for infrastructure projects in the

region, and reiterated that Brazil should exploit the Amazon rainforest for economic
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Brazilian Government,

"The Rural Explosion, "

h:://www.brasii.gov .br/ingles/about_brazil/indicators/cat_ agri/categoria_view.
The military government constructed the Trans-Amazon in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to mass

IO

migration and the devastating deforestation statistics witnessed today, Ballve, Marcelo,

"Brazil: Paving the

A m az o n , " Corp Watch, (March 5, 2005), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=I I 944.
109

Greenpeace International, "Eating up the A m az o n , " (April 2006), 27, available at
hnJ>://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/7555.pdf.
1 1

Mato Grosso is known for its soybean and beef. Santarem is known for its grain terminal and its
\irrortant po�_on the �mazon �ver.

.

.

.

The Brazilian media gave highway B R - 1 6 3 its nickname. See Marcelo Ballve, "Brazil: Paving the

Amazon," Corp Watch, (March 5, 2005), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=l

1 944.
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The

governor is

affiliated with

Partido Popular S oc i a l is t.
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growth. The federal government is constrained by the decentralized political system, to

the point that in 2003 the government of Mato Grosso gained acceptance for legislation to

reduce the Xingu State Park by 30 percent'{' to clear more land for agriculture

production. With the current deforestation trend, 40 percent of the Amazon will be gone

1 1 4

by 2050,

which will add additional stress to the environment and exacerbate

greenhouse gas emissions. With the devastating reality of deforestation and how massive

population increase will have devastating consequences for the rainforest and its wildlife,

the Lula government has realized that it must introduce laws and enforcement

mechanisms to strictly control the growth in the area around B R - 1 6 3 . In mid-February

2006, Lula signed a decree creating seven new environmental protected areas bordering

the B R - 1 6 3 road to ensure that the highway does not result in uncontrolled illegal

1 1 5

logging.

1 1 6

IBAMA,

Brazil's environmental protection agency, has received additional

funding and personnel to ensure the enforcement of these new decrees. IBAMA still

needs some time to restore its credibility after half of 89 people that were arrested of

illegal logging in summer 2005 were people working for IBAMA, including the state

chief of Mato Grosso.

The government wishes to allow more expansion of agribusiness for exports and

biofuel, while at the same time it attempts to strike down more forcefully upon illegal
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Barreto and others, "Human Pressure on the Brazilian Amazon Forests, 60.
114

Greenpeace International, "Eating up the Amazon," April 2006,
hf?>://www.greenpeace.org.uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/Ful!Report/7555.pdf.
1 1

Lula also signed a decree declaring additional 150,000 hectares as Amazon national park. Together the
decrees bring the total protected area in that region of Para to 6.4 million hectares. The Amazon region as a
whole now has 4 5 . 8 million hectares of protected area, which is an area the size of Sweden. Environment
News Service, "Brazil expands Amazon National Park, Creates Forest Reserves" (February 1 5 , 2006),
h�://www .ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2006/2006-02-15-03 .asp.
11

Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Naturais Renoaveis (IBAMA), Brazil's
Environmental Protection Agency.
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logging. Unfortunately, the law enforcement is too lax and lack resources to expand.

Agribusiness has become the driving force of the economy, and agribusiness companies

continue forcefully to lobby

the Congress, making the government unwilling or incapable

of sanctioning them on such misconduct. As a result, corporate interests and lobbying act

as major constraints in Lula's pursuit of sustainable development policies.

The Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock and Supply is predicting that a further 3 0

million hectares will be added within the next

1 5 years to grazing lands. That is not to say

that the expansion will happen at the expense of the rainforest, but it gives the indication

that environmental preservation will be sacrificed over economic growth. The new forest

policies are positive since they show that the government actively seeks a sustainable

future in the Amazon rainforest but it is difficult to predict whether the policies will

actually accomplish that.

117

According to the Environmental Sustainability I n d e x

Brazil has improved its

overall environmental performance since Lula came to power. Certain measures stand out

such as improvements in preserving biodiversity, environmental health, participation in

and international collaborative efforts. Unfortunately, the Lula government has not been

able to adequately address poor air and water quality. Brazil hosted the Eight Ordinary

Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in

Curitiba in March 2006. The government clearly shows that it takes environmental

protection seriously but agribusiness i s adding to economic growth and not protected

forest reserves.
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The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) measures the ability ofnations to protect the envirorunent
over the next several decades through 2 1 indicators of environmental sustainability consisting of 76 data
sets that track natural resource endowments, past and present pollution levels, environmental management
efforts, and the capacity of a society to improve its environmental performance.

40

Table 4. Environmental Sustainability Index- Brazil

Components

2002 rank of

2005 rank

142

of 146

countries

countries

Difference

Environmental Sustainability Index:

20

11

+ 9

GDP/Capita:

$6,973

$6,755

- $218

Environmental Systems

19

25

- 6

Air Oualitv

68

118

- 50

Biodiversity

1 1 9

59

+ 60

land

21

27

- 6

Water Quality

25

50

- 25

Water Quantity

16

17

- I

Reduce Environmental Stress

19

39

- 20

Reducing Air Pollution

70

67

+ 3

Reducing Ecosystem stress

59

65

- 6

Reducing Population Pressure/growth (2002)

59

56

+ 3

Reducing Waste and Consumption Pressures

79

69

+ 1 0

Reducing Water Stress

45

62

- 17

Reducing Human Vulnerability

59

53

+ 6

Environmental Health

69

48

+ 21

Basic Human Sustenance

59

61

- 2

Social and Institutional Capability

43

37

+ 6

Environmental Governance

48

54

- 6

Eco-Efficiency

19

23

- 4

Private Sector Responsiveness

39

31

+ 8

Science and Technology

73

68

+ 5

Participation in International Collaborative Efforts

80

22

+ 58

Global Stewardship

83

35

+ 48

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

51

45

+ 6

Reducing Trans-boundary Environmental Pressures

119

72

+ 47

The table has been created for the purpose of this thesis. Source: Environmental Sustainability Index 2002
and 2005.
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Chapter 4. Venezuela

For four decades, between 1 9 5 8 and 1 9 9 8 , the Punto Fijo Pact ensured that only

118

two political parties

had access to power. The Chavez presidential victory in 1 9 9 8 was

a response to an increasing number of people living in poverty, mainly as a result of the

oil crisis in the 1 9 8 0 s , widespread corruption within public office, social exclusion and

unwillingness by the leaders to distribute resources more fairly. The government revenue

from oil did not benefit the poor, who became disenchanted with a government that did

not represent them. Today, political structure in Venezuela is highly centralized with

concentration of power resting with the president. Venezuela discovered oil in the 1 9 2 0 s ,

and since then every government has profited from the valuable asset, though the

distribution of the revenue has primarily benefited the privileged few and not the poor,.

until Chavez came to power.

119

Oil is seen as the engine of the Chavez 2 1 s t Century Social Revolution

contributing to a third of Venezuela's gross domestic product (GDP), which has helped

him remain in power for almost eight years. Through the national oil company, Petr6leos

de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), Venezuela is earning large profits on its oil exports and

has great potential to invest in sustainable development policies. As long as the

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) does not increase production

levels, the prices are predicted to remain at $60 a barrel or increase, contributing

118

The two political parties were the Democratic Action Party (AD) and the Comite Organizaci6n Politica
Electoral Independiente (COPEi).
119

Jenny Mero and Nelson D. Schwartz,

"Oil's New Mr. Big," Fortune, Vol. 1 5 2 , Issue 7, October 3,

2005.
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considerably to Venezuela's economy and government spending. To reduce the volatility

in the market, and to maintain the levels of profits, Chavez has urged OPEC to set a

minimum price level at $50 for a barrel of oil. With these forecasts, President Chavez's

social programs will continue to receive adequate funding to prosper, and his vision of an

egalitarian society may become a reality. Whether this is a lasting strategy and leading to

sustainable development from an ecological point of view will be discussed in the next

sections.

The Chavez Era

President Chavez is a self-declared revolutionary with a vision of a 21st-Century

Socialist Revolution with the aim of ending poverty and social exclusion by 2 0 2 1 . For

this reason, his supporters perceive him as Venezuela's savior. At the same time, his

critics see his leadership as an authoritarian dictatorship. Currently, the main foe of

President Chavez is the United States government, which does not agree with his political

121

agenda'f" or his Rosseauian democratic leadership.

The US government's vocal attack

against Chavez has not proven effective since an increasing number of democratically

elected leftist leaders in the South American region are willing to cooperate with Chavez

rather than the U S . Despite the hostile relationship that also acts as a constraint to

120

President Chavez's foreign policy objectives are highly debated in Washington. Chavez has been
reported trying to buy nuclear power, he is maintaining close relationships with both Iran and China, and he
has threatened to cut off oil supply to the US. With an estimated $20 billion in revenue from oil exports in
2005, Chavez has the money to influence the region in what some call charity and others view as strategic
political maneuvering. The President bought $ 1 . 5 billion of Argentina's debt, and has offered to buy some
of Ecuador's debt. He sells oil at reduced prices to Caribbean countries and Cuba; and he has even shipped
cheap heating fuel to destitute neighborhoods in New York and Massachusetts.
121

Jean-Jacques Rosseau was a French philosopher who believed that great heroic, charismatic leaders
could lead its people in innovative, revolutionary, new directions as part of a direct democracy where
institutions serving as checks and balances were not needed since they would get in the way for the leader's
ability to act on the general w i l l . Wiarda, Democracy in Latin America: Crises and Opportunity,

I 06-107.
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Chavez, the US is Venezuela's most important trading partner both for imports and

122

exports and the US remains highly dependent on Venezuela for o i l .

Chavez grew up in meager settings as one of six siblings born to parents who

worked as primary school teachers in western Venezuela. He gave up a dream of

becoming a professional baseball player and joined the military instead succeeding to the

ranks of paratroop commander. Chavez became politically active in 1 9 8 2 as one of the

four founders of the Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 200 (MBR 200) but he did not

enter the public scene until 1992, when he was in charge of a failed coup to overthrow the

government of Carlos Andres Perez. Chavez was imprisoned but pardoned two years

later by then President Rafael Caldera. Chavez traveled to Cuba to seek inspiration, and

after returning to Venezuela, he actively started campaigning for the presidency touring

123

the country proclaiming the slogan "Constitutional Assembly now!"

In 1 9 9 7 , Chavez's

Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) was born. The following year, Chavez won the

124

presidential election as the candidate of Patriotic Pole (Polo Patriotico- PP),

without

ever holding public office. Chavez utilized political rhetoric challenging the status quo by

promising to end poverty and corruption. His rhetoric appealed to 5 6 . 5 percent of voters

that elected him president of Venezuela in 1 9 9 8 . Under the new constitution, Chavez was

re-elected president in 2000 granting him nearly 60 percent of the votes that reconfirmed

his popularity as the President of the newly named Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
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The Bush Administration has stated the need to become less dependent on oil supplies from the Middle
East and will need to increase oil imports from other nations, including Venezuela.
123

Martha Hamecker, "Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution," Hugo Chavez talks to Martha
Hamecker, translated by Chesa Boudin, New York: Monthly Review Press, (2005), 1 8 .
124

The Patriotic Pole is an alliance of Chavez's own political party, the Fifth Republic Movement
(Movimiento Quinta Republica, MVR), and two other leftist parties, Homeland for All (Patria Para Todos,

PPT) and Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS).
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In his first year in office, Chavez chose to implement comprehensive changes to

Congress and the Supreme Court, and to introduce a proposal for a new constitution. The

proposal was approved in a referendum by 7 1 percent of the votes in December 1 9 9 9 .

125

The new constitution included more citizen participation and power

but it also

increased presidential might and control. President Chavez has therefore been criticized

for inhibiting democracy, and the opposition claims the Chavez presidency weakens

existing institutions such as the Supreme Court and the Central Bank, by only staffing

them with people loyal to him. Chavez is also criticized for limiting freedom of speech.

This was reinforced after a new law was passed that the media, which is among the

126

President's most ardent critics, claims restricts freedom of the press even further.

Despite such widespread dissent, Chavez has survived both a short-lived coup in

2002, and a recall election in August 2004. Parliamentary elections were held in

December 2005 and supporters of Chavez gained all 1 6 7 seats in Congress, consolidating

the President's power even further. According to the opposition, 7 5 percent of the voters

127

boycotted the election over fear of the consequences if they did not vote for Chavez.

The European Union and the Organization of American States declared the elections as

fair, though this has been contested with criticism of the methods used for monitoring the

electi on. The likelihood of the opposition defeating Chavez in the presidential election in
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According to the constitution, any government position could be put to a referendum if 20 percent of
registered voters sign a petition.
12

The law states that anyone who with "words or in writing or in any other way disrespects the President
of the Republic or whomever is ful fill ing his duties" can be sent to prison for up to 30 months, while
exposing others to "contempt or public hatred" or publishing inaccurate reports causing "public panic or
anxiety" may lead to longer sentences Ellison, Katherine, "Venezuela Steers a New Course," Smithsonian,
January 2006, Vol. 36 Issue

I

0, (January 2006), 60- 7 1 .
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A few weeks before the election, a CD was leaked to journalists containing information on 1 2 million
voters, including how they had voted in previous elections. El lis on , Venezuela Steers a New Course, 60- 7 1 .
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December 2006 is slim. The opposition lacks a good candidate, and Chavez's messages

and policies are appealing to the poor, who are still in majority in Venezuela.

Sustainable Development

Sustainable development is embraced in the 1 9 9 9 Constitution, where chapter nine

129

128

is devoted to environmental rights.

In 2 0 0 1 , built on Article 1 2 8

of the Constitution,

President Chavez introduced "Special Zones of Sustainable Development" to promote

local socioeconomic development managed by the communities themselves through

sustainable agriculture, industry and tourism. Venezuela has signed Agenda 2 1 but there

has been no implementation of a national plan that would actually create action.

Chavez introduced his own version of sustainable development in May 2004, which

he has called "The Bolivarian Agenda for the Endogenous Development." The

endogenous development promotes sustainable economic and social growth taking place

from within. The aim is to introduce economic policies that emphasize the active

involvement of the state in the domestic and the world economy. So far the government

has only increased its ownership in the oil sector, which will be addressed in the section

on economic growth. The endogenous development is at the core of Chavez's ambition of

130

"liberating Venezuela from the capitalist model"

by making the country self-
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Article 127 reads that it is the right and duty of each generation to protect and maintain the environment
for its own benefit and that of the world of the future. VHeadline, "1999 Constitution o
f the Bolivarian

Republic o
f Venezuela," English translation of the original text by VHeadline, (March 24, 2000),
hw://www.vheadline.com/printer_news.asp?id=683 l .
12

Article 1 2 8 reads that the State shall develop a zoning policy taking into account ecological,
geographic, demographic, social, cultural, economic and political realities, in accordance with the premises
of sustainable development, including information, consultation and male/female participation by citizens.
VHeadline, 1999 Constitution o
f the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
130

Gregory Wilpert,

"Chavez Rejects Support of Venezuelan Pro-Government Guerrilla,"

Venezuelaanalysis.com, (Monday October 4, 2004), http://venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno"'l377.
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sustainable.

Constraints

With more direct presidential power, Chavez is not faced with the same

constraints as Lula. Common constraints that have already been identified include

poverty, income inequality and lack of land reform. The major constraints to why Chavez

is not successful in implementing sustainable development policies include massive

domestic gasoline and energy subsidization. Chavez's foreign policy agenda and the

strained relationship with the US are also important constraints since it takes focus away

from prioritizing sustainable development policies. The following empirical analysis will

present the constraints identified in Table 5 .

Table 5. The most prevalent constraints that hinder Chavez in implementing
sustainable development policies in Venezuela

Political Constraints

Economic Constraints

Social Constraints

Populist tendencies

Inflation

Income inequality

Foreign policy

Public debt

Lack of land reform

Lax law enforcement

Subsidization

High energy use

Upcoming elections
Fear of coup d'etat

Social Equity

In 1 9 7 6 , the Venezuelan government nationalized the oil industry when oil prices

and living standards were high and politics were stable. The oil crisis in the 1 9 8 0 s hit

Venezuela especially hard, since the country had made itself very dependent on the

47

income of oil exports since the discovery of o i l . Hundreds of thousands of families from

the middle class became poor. Since then, the poor, who compose close to half of the

population; have not benefited much from the oil profits until Chavez took office.

President Chavez fulfilled his election promises by allocating large parts of the country's

oil revenue towards pro-poor social p o l i c i e s .

Pro-poor Social Programs

In 2 0 0 5 , social expenditures were

1 4 . 6 9 percent of GDP, which is a 50 percent

131

increase since Chavez took power in

1998.

As a consequence of national oil strikes and

an attempted coup d'etat in 2002-2003, the economy took a fall, which increased the

country's poverty rates. To reverse this trend Chavez chose to follow advice from the

Cuban government.

He introduced several pro-poor social programs called " m i s s i o n s " .

51

that were widely established in 2003 as part of the President's 2 1

Century Socialist

Revolution. The ultimate objective is an equitable distribution of resources and to

improve the daily life of the poor. To achieve this, the state will provide free education

for all, guarantee food security and offer free health services.
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In 1 9 9 8 , social spending as part of GDP was 7 . 8 3 percent. See Jose Sojo Reyes, "Embassy of

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela," Minister Counselor- Chief of Economic Affairs, available at
http://www.embavenez-us.org/econom ic _development_2006.pdf.
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Table 6. Pro-poor social missions

Missions

Purpose

Mission Robinson

Seeks to end literacy

Mission Ribas

Seeks to give school drop-out a second chance to finish school

Mission Sucre

Provides free higher education

Mission Barrio

Provides health services to the poor

Adentro
Mission Mercal

Provides the poor with affordable food from government subsidized
stores

Mission Habitat

Provides housing for the poor

Mission Vuelvan

Seeks to end unemployment through a transformed economy

Caras
Mission Guaicaipuro

Protects indigenous rights

Mission Rias

Improves life of miners through sustainable m i n in g

Mission Zamora

Promotes land reform

Mission Identidad

Provides identity cards to facilitate access to social services

Mission Vuelta al

Seeks to revive the agricultural sector by attracting people to move to the

Campo

countryside with the aim of become self-sustainable

The missions are very popular with the poor who view Chavez as the President who

finally cares about them. A reflection of this was reported in a 2004 regional survey

conducted by Latinbarometro. In Venezuela "the fewest people believe that the country is

being governed for the few, and where the most believe that it is governed for the good of

132

the people."

Until 2005, the poverty rates have continued to worsen since Chavez came

to power but there are signs, though contested, that the poverty levels are actually

improving. According to government figures, 33 percent of all families in Venezuela live

in poverty. Poverty continues to pose a constraint on the government in achieving

sustainable development, since the poor people's immediate needs are not necessarily

measures that take ecological sustainability into account. Mission Barrio Adentro gives

free health care to the poor that live in slums with help from 20,000 Cuban health
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Corporacion Lationobarometro, "Informe- Resumen Latinobarometro 2004 Una Decada de
Mediciones, "(August 1 3 , 2004), available at http://www.latinobarometro.org/uploads/media/2004_02.pdf.
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workers whose services are paid for through a barter system where Cuba receives oil in

133

return for heath personnel. This initiative is benefiting 69 percent of the population

Mission Robinson has the objective of ending illiteracy in Venezuela and benefited 1 . 3

135

134

million people in 2004.

and Chavez

Venezuela has one of the highest literacy rates in the region

strongly emphasizes education in social programs, guaranteeing everybody

free education up to university level.

Mission Ribas contributes to give people who had

previously been unable to complete their secondary education, the opportunity to finalize
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their studies. By the end of 2005, 2 1 1 , 2 8 9 had graduated under this program.

Mission

Sucre aims at giving all an opportunity to receive higher education with the establishment

of more universities and providing scholarships for people to be able to attend them. The

President has introduced new Bolivarian Universities, which according to the opposition,

are given preferential treatment over the old ones. The government's approach to higher

education has therefore been criticized for losing its autonomy and becoming too

influenced by ideology. Under the Mission Identidad, 5,076,000 people have been

registered and given identification documents (among whom only 600,000 were

137

Venezuelans), which is the first requirement to becoming a Venezuelan citizen.

Under

Mission Mercal the government established subsidized discounted stores, which gives
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Achievements, " Annual Message delivered by President Hugo Chavez to the National Assembly to present
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write. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005.
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d_temas=40.
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poor people access to cheap food by selling it at 40 percent below market price. ns

Implementing food security is a good deed, but the state-subsidized stores are also

believed to force small stores out of business.

Despite these positive initiatives, poverty alleviation is unlikely to be achieved in

the immediate future, since 4 8 . 6 percent were still living below the poverty line in

140

139

2002.

Venezuela also struggles with income inequality,

since the poorest 20 percent

of Venezuelans only receive three percent of the country's total income, compared to the

141

richest 20 percent of Venezuelans who receive 53 .4 percent.

Similar to other nations in

the region, land distribution is skewed. Five percent of landowners possess more than 75

142

percent of farmland.

To reduce this social injustice, the President introduced the 200 l

Land and Agricultural Reform Law. The law provides credit, training, and marketing for

new farmers in order to make them more competitive to be able to survive on more than

143

purely subsistence farming. To step up the efforts, Chavez introduced Mission Zamora

in 2005.

The government is the largest rural landowner in Venezuela with more than eight

million hectares of farmland. By the end of 2004, Chavez had redistributed about 2.2

million hectares of state owned land to more than 1 3 0 , 0 0 0 peasant families and
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This includes 77.2 percent of Venezuela's poor and 49 percent of the total population. Reyes, Embassy

of Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
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The poverty rates are defined as percentage of the population that have incomes amounting to less than
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The Gini coefficient measured 4 9 . 1 in 2 0 0 1 , United Nations Development Programme, Human
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United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2005.
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Mark Becker, "land Reform in Venezuela," Global Exchange, (July 4, 2004), available at
httf://www.globalexchange.org/countries/americas/venezuela/vzlandreform.pdf.
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The mission is intended to expropriate private idle land or private land that lacks title. Chavez also
introduced the National Agricultural Commission to examine and establish property titles in 2005.
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144

cooperatives.

With close to 90 percent of the population living in the cities, urban land

reform is also of urgent demand. A Presidential Decree introduced in February 2002

145

gives poor people living in the barrios

the opportunity to apply for ownership of their

homes through local Urban Land Committees (CTU).

As long as they can prove that

they built their homes, they will be granted legal tenure. This is believed not only to

improve the living conditions of individual families but also improve the barrios

generally, since a sense of ownership would make people take better care of their homes

and neighborhoods, in addition to making them feel more secure and increased trust in

the government.

The oil was indeed a blessing for Venezuela but at the same time it has damaged

the agricultural sector. Venezuela has the least productive agriculture sector in the region

and as a result, Venezuela needs to import 70 percent of all its food. With plenty of

productive farmland available, Chavez introduced the Mission Vuelta al Campo in 2003,

which is an initiative to bring people back to the countryside by offering them access to

land and credit. This initiative is part of the greater endogenous development with the

146

ambition of making Venezuela self-sustainable in food production.

Part of this socialist

vision also includes creating state-financed cooperatives to create employment, and

further enhance the agriculture sector. According to the Ministry of Popular Economy, as

of December 2005, there exist some 94,000 cooperatives compared to only 877 in
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A barrio is a poor neighborhood.
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Chavez has ordered banks to earmark 29 percent of their total loans for farming and housing at
subsidized rates.
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1999.

The Vue/van Caras Mission is also an integral part of the endogenous

development that seeks to decrease unemployment and social exclusion by providing the

unemployed with comprehensive technical training with the intent of forming

cooperatives in production and services.

Economic Growth

In 2004, Venezuela had a record high growth rate of 1 7 percent. According to the

148

government this included a growth of 29 percent for non-oil exports.

In 2005, the

growth rate fell to almost 1 0 percent but the trend of higher growth rates in the non-oil

149

sectors

persisted. Interest rates are improving, though inflation remains fairly high.

Unemployment rates are down but still above 1 0 percent. According to government

figures, Venezuela's international reserves reached $25 billion in 2004. On the other

150

hand, foreign direct investment (FDI) has decreased. Income from truc e s

continues to

be the primary source of non-oil revenue contributing to over half of the 2006 budget.

The government plans to reduce the external debt by $4.7 billion in 2006, which is a 1 5 . 2
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54.6 percent deal with services, 3 8 . 9 percent in production, 3 . 6 percent in social protection, 0 . 7 1 percent
in saving and credit, and 0 . 1 5 percent in housing. Ministerio de Economia Popular, Venezuela "Anuncio el
ministro Elias Jaua Todo el peso de la Ley contra cooperativas irregulars," (December 1 9 , 2005),
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In 2004 non-oil tax revenues grew 85 percent. Embassy of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2004:

Year o
f Bolivarian Achievements.
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percent decrease to a total of 26.3 b i l l i o n

to possess better liquidity needed to spur

economic growth. Despite the economic recession in 2002-2003, as seen in Table 7, the

IMF is predicting a steady increase in purchasing power parity per capita of GDP,

Venezuela's current account balance will still remain at positive levels. As long as the oil

prices remain at current levels of between $ 5 0 and $60 a barrel, the economic prognosis

looks good. Remembering past experience, there is still some concern of what may

happen to the country's economy if oil prices suddenly drop. The economist's recipe is

clear; the government should emphasize further diversification of the economy.

Table 7. Economic Outlook -Venezuela

Subject
Description

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

JO.I

1.6

8.2

13.7

12.5

19.1

14.1

13.4

5470.7

5735.2

5214.0

4814.7

5708.9

6186.2

6467.1

6614.0

12.5

22.4

3 1.1

21.7

1998

1999

2000

-4.9

2.2

5629.8

5266.1

35.8

23.6

2007

Current account
balance in percent
'

of GDP. Ratio

(PPP) per capita
GDP.

US$ in Units

Inflation, annual
percent change

16.2

15.9

11.7

17.3

Source: International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook Database," (April 2006), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/weo/2006/0 I /data/index.htm

Social Economy

Instead of following the advice from international economists who adhere to neo-

liberal principles, Chavez's ambition is to establish a well-functioning social economy.

By financing those who had been excluded from the benefits of the traditional banking
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According to the Finance Minister, Nelson Merentes, the government aims to reduce the debt to less
than 25 percent of the GDP by 2008. Alex Holland, "Venezuela lowers Foreign Debt by $4. 7 billion,"
Venezuelaanalysis.com, (March 2, 2006), http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news.php?newsno:;;;; 1906.
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sector, the government is promoting the creation of cooperatives in the form of

community- and family businesses. This prioritization of small and medium-sized

businesses that currently are employing over half the population has caused an increase in

.
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Venezuela's Oil Economy

With the sixth largest oil reserves in the world, Venezuela can continue to pump oil

153

for another 1 0 0 years.

With 80 percent of all exports coming from oil, and 25 percent

154

of GDP from the same source adding to more than half of government revenue,

it is

easy to understand that Venezuelan politics revolve around oil. In order to understand

Venezuela's current economic status, the domestic oil sector must be examined, and

Venezuela's long history as rentier state. Rentier states are countries that receive

155

significant amounts of external economic rent

on a regular basis often seen in countries

156

that possess large oil reserves.

This external income enables governments to exercise

large public spending without raising taxes. At the same time this mono-dependency is

making the economy vulnerable to external shocks such as volatile oil prices. Rentier

economies often experience a downfall in domestically manufactured goods and need to

152

Micro credit is provided by the Bank of the People, the Micro Financing Development Fund
(FUNDEMI), the Women's Bank (BANMUJER), and the Social End Economic Development Bank
(BAND ES).
153
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157

import more,

which has been observed in Venezuela. Chavez is grappling with the

rents differently than previous governments by using the oil revenue to increase spending

on pro-poor social programs rather than favoring the elite. President Chavez does what he

can to keep o i l prices at current levels, clearly aware that a crisis w i l l hamper his socialist

vision and his chances of reelection in December 2006. With increased spending on

158

social programs,

the Chavez government has decided to further nationalize the o i l

industry by introducing joint ventures of o i l fields where the government will control

159

more than 5 1

percent.

This way, Chavez can control more of the oil production and its

revenue. With small chances of oil prices drastically falling, the government is optimistic

regarding its financial prospects and continues to spend.

The 2 1 s t Century Socialist Revolution also includes closer integration of the South

American region. Chavez's dream is to create a common oil company in the region,

"Petroamerica," which will be controlled by state-run oil companies. Chavez is also

among the main instigators behind building a 6200-mile long pipeline through the

160

Amazon rainforest to carry natural gas across the region,

which has caused objections

especially over the predicted devastating ecological impacts on the Amazon rainforest. It

appears that the President's top priority is letting the oil flow at all costs, and

envirorunental sustainability is not added into that policy.

157

This condition is described as the "Dutch Disease."
158

The state-run oil company PDSV A earmarked $4 billion of its internal budgets in 2005 for social
programs and infrastructure projects. Smith, Geri, "Killing the Golden Goose?" Business Week, Issue
3924, (March 1 4 , 2005), www.lexisnexis.com.
159

If foreign oil companies wish to continue operations in the country, they must sign the contracts. Most
have signed, since they are aware that if they exit, other firms could easily replace them.
160

The pipeline would stretch from Venezuela in the North, through Brazil, and to Argentina in the South,
with links to Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay.
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Environmental Protection

Being a top oil producer for about 80 years has caused extensive environmental

degradation. Government subsidization of gasoline does not exactly improve the

situation. Venezuela sells gasoline at among the lowest price in the world. A gallon sells

161

at approximately 1 5 cents,

which makes water more expensive. As a result of this

162

cheap subsidized gas, car sales

increased 55 percent in the first quarter of 2006

compared to the same period last year causing reduced air quality in Venezuela's

163

cities.

This subsidization is primarily benefiting the wealthy Venezuelans, since most

of the poor do not have cars. With highly subsidized gas prices, there is little incentive to

reduce the consumption levels and introduce more environmentally friendly public

transport systems. Apart from the metro in the biggest cities, there is no public transport

system running on electricity, though a railway system is apparently under construction.

The government has instead substituted a lot of old cabs with new ones.

Venezuela is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol that seeks to reduce greenhouse

gas emissions, though as a non-Annex I country it is not required to the same strict

commitments. The government has implied it would attempt to cut its carbon and

greenhouse gas emissions, though little action has been taken, and as a result Venezuela

continues to be the greatest emitter of carbon dioxide in the region. The country's

hydrocarbon industry is also the source of much of these carbon dioxide emissions. To

reduce this trend, the national oil company PDVSA will introduce Plan 474, intended to

161

International Monetary Fund, "World Economic Outlook: Globalization and Inflation," (April 2006,)
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2006/0l/index.htin.
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produce 25,000 ethanol barrels per day, and create jobs for 600,000 people from 2009.

Other government initiatives include phasing out leaded gasoline and initiating

reforestation but not enough is yet being done. The bottom line is that reducing domestic

gasoline subsidization would be the most effective strategy but this is an unlikely

alternative, since there are few substitutes in place. With state subsidies also keeping

natural gas and electricity prices low, Venezuela has the highest electricity consumption

165

per capita in South America.

Venezuela has the potential to produce energy from

renewable sources such as wind and solar energy but this has not been of priority to the

government. Instead it continues to expand its hydropower and hydrocarbon industries.

The government has built pipelines through national parks to export hydropower to Brazil

that may harm the environment.

The environment does not appear as a primary concern for the government, even

though Venezuela has among the richest biodiversity in the world with many natural

resources such as minerals, natural gas and oil. Venezuela also has vast forest reserves,

hosting parts of the Amazon rainforest within its borders. Similar to trends throughout the

region, the forests are shrinking rapidly over demands for agribusiness, and especially

166

feeding-grounds for cattle. An average rate of 2 1 8 , 0 0 0 hectares

disappears annually,

which is the third-highest deforestation rate in South America. The timber industry is an

important export-source with an estimated 1 0 million hectares of forest allocated for

timber production. Logging companies are allowed to use selective logging in 1 2
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Ministerio Energia and Petr61eo, "PD VSA will be producing 2 5, 000 barrels of ethanol from sugar
cane," Reproduction of interview in El Nacional, (February 28, 2006,)
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percent

of the total territory in the Imataca Forest that according to the Minister of

Environment, Jacqueline Farias, does not constitute deforestation. The Minister does

emphasize that companies that do not obey the country's environmental laws can be

closed down, though there seems to be few enforcement mechanisms to oversee this.

Current environmental concerns also include irresponsible and illegal mining operations,

which is also an important export commodity. The government wishes to ban all mining

in the state of Amazonas to avoid environmental degradation, and especially river

pollution, though this has yet to be enforced. To set a good example, the government

makes sure that the state mining company Minerven produces in a sustainable manner

and according to Venezuela's environmental laws.

According to the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), Venezuela's

environmental performance is rather poor when compared to the potential and resources

it has to prioritize environmental sustainability and sustainable natural resource

management. In only three years, Venezuela fell 34 spots mainly over deteriorating air

quality and lack of biodiversity preservation, which are directly correlated to gasoline and

energy subsidization. Water quality has worsened drastically, and the government has

failed in reducing environmental stress that focuses on threats posed on the environment

based on human activities. Within that category, reducing ecosystem stress, which

include deforestation and acidification have been ignored. Venezuela's overall

performance is not going to improve unless the government places environmental

protection higher up on the agenda and introduces policies that aim to incorporate

environmental sustainability as a prerequisite for economic growth.
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So far the government has not chosen a very consistent environmental protection

policy. Chavez uses impressive rhetoric on the importance of sustainable development

but little action has been taken. The government continues to promote mineral extraction,

and oil and gas production, while not appearing to concentrate much on the possible

environmental consequences for Venezuela and the world in general.

Table 8. Venezuela- Environmental Sustainability Index

Components

2002 Rank

2005 Rank

of 142

of 146

Difference

countries

countries

ESI:

48

82

GDP/Capita:

$6,009

$4,269

- $1740

Environmental Systems

5

21

- 16

Air Quality

42

85

-43

Biodiversity

29

8

+ 21

land

20

30

- 10

Water Quality

37

116

- 79

Water Quantity

15

18

- 3

- 34

Reduce Environmental Stress

33

56

- 23

Reducing Air Pollution

96

82

+ 14

Reducing Ecosystem stress

20

66

- 46

Reducing Population Pressure/growth (2002)

76

81

- 5

Reducing waste and consumption pressures

92

70

+22

Reducing Water Stress

38

65

- 27

Reducing Human Vulnerabilitv

76

94

- 18

Environmental Health

71

65

+ 6

Basic Human Sustenance

84

91

-7

Social and Institutional Canabilitv

123

110

+ 13

Environmental Governance

96

85

+ 1 1

Eco-efficiency

124

129

- 5

Private Sector Responsiveness

141

124

+ 17

Science and Technology

78

58

+20

Global Stewardship

128

123

+ 5

Participation in International Collaborative Efforts

95

75

+ 20

Greenhouse Gas Emissions

122

121

+ 1

Reducing Transboundary Environmental Pressures

116

128

- 12

The table has been created for the purpose of this thesis. Source: Environmental Sustainability Index 2002
and 2005.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion

There are major differences between the two leaders and the situations in the

countries that have been studied here, which need to be taken into consideration.

President Lula is a moderate leftist leader with slight neo-populist tendencies who does

not possess the same political powers as Chavez. President Lula is mainly restricted by

political constraints such as Brazil's political structure, while Chavez is mainly

constrained by his subsidization policies. Both leaders are hindered by social constraints

including poverty, income inequality and distorted land distribution and lack of land

reform. Common economic constraints include public debt, and common political

constraints include lax law enforcement and upcoming elections. As a result of different

political orientation, distinct domestic situation and constraints, the leaders have

experienced different successes with the implementation of sustainable development

.

policies, which will be concluded below.

Brazil

During the election campaign Lula represented a leftist political platform to

specifically attract the marginalized, poor voters that would finally elect him president of

Brazil. The way Lula used pro-poor rhetoric did resemble populist tendencies, and the

promises of following neo-liberal economic policies resembled what a neo-populist

would do. Lula's first years in power were influenced by conservative efforts to stabilize

the economy and little was done to fulfill the election promises of ending poverty and

reducing inequality. In 2006, Lula's policy choices resemble more the leftist leader with
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populist tendencies that he was perceived as before winning the election in 2002, but

without the negative connotation.

Lula is stepping up investments in social programs that will benefit the poor while

not drastically changing the economic policies now that stability is restored. The main

·

challenge facing Lula in prioritizing sustainable development policies involve balancing

the demands and intensive lobbying from private companies for greater economic

growth, against the necessity to ensure environmental protection of especially the

Amazon rainforest. Lula knows that economic development will lead to increased

government revenue that can be spent on social programs, create more jobs and at least in

the short-term keep people content. At the same time he is aware that increased

expansion of certain sectors such as agribusiness will be detrimental to Brazil's forests.

Powerful corporations have already been successful in lobbying the government to pass

legislation to build the "Soybean Highway" across the Amazon rainforest to advance

economic development.

To mitigate the possible negative consequences, the president is

taking measures that will hinder massive migration there. Unless enforcement

mechanisms are increased in conjunction with the building of the highway and

agribusiness expansion, it is questionable whether Lula's environmental protection

policies will lead to sustainable development. Without adequate policing, illegal

deforestation will continue. Corruption continues to be a major constraint; where paying

officials to turn a blind eye on illegal deforestation is a problem in local politics and

within the government's own environmental protection agency, and on the national level

with the minister of finance's resignation. Without effective continuous crackdowns on

illegal activity, this might not change. The constraint of not having majority in Congress
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to easily gain support for stricter legislation and prioritize enforcement does not help. The

political will is present, in both the President and the Minister of Environment, to set

environmental protection as a prerequisite for economic growth and social equity, and

policies have been introduced towards achieving that.

In the run up before the 2006 October presidential election, President Lula is

attempting to implement policies that are important to his constituency. The people that

brought him to power the first time, primarily the poor, are still interested in social

policies, land reform and environmental protection. By adhering to populist tendencies by

being responsive to the people's will, President Lula is on the right track of implementing

sustainable development policies. It is not so much because of his political orientation but

primarily because of public demands that call for long-term sustainable development

policies. With comprehensive local Agenda 2 1 action plans in place across the country,

there is greater public awareness about the goals of sustainable development, which is

more apparent in their demands. In order for the sustainable development policies to be

successful, Lula will have to strictly supervise the expansion of agribusiness, and

lobbying of the Congress, in addition to environmentally abusive legislation implemented

at the local level as witnessed in Mato Grosso. With the prognosis of slower economic

growth, Lula must show political will to convince his alliances in Congress of the need to

prioritize sustainable development from an ecological point of view.

Venezuela

51

The policies and initiatives that are part of President Chavez's 2 1

Century

Socialist Revolution, including the establishment of cooperatives with the aim of making

63

Venezuela self-sustainable, have the stated intention of leading to sustainable

development. Chavez's rhetoric is undeniably favoring sustainable development but

again there is lack of concrete action. A government that depends on revenue from oil

production as a substantial part of its budget is not sustainable unless it is also paired with

comprehensive environmental protection. This is not the case in Venezuela.

Chavez is constrained by the fear of a coup d'etat. If oil prices fall sharply, there

is the possibility that Chavez may lose hold on power.

A president that has already been

victim of a coup once may well find himself in the same situation again, and then the

coup may not fail. The generosity of Chavez to sell oil for cheap or in barter programs

with countries in the region is not a lasting strategy since volatile oil prices; makes it

questionable how long Venezuela can continue the solidarity policy. The missions or

social policies that Chavez has implemented may prove successful in reducing inequality,

increasing agriculture output, reducing illiteracy rates, and keeping the population well

fed and healthy, thereby creating a more egalitarian society. Such social progress does

not immediately also create environmental sustainability. According to the

Environmental Sustainability Index, the environmental situation in Venezuela is far from

ideal and actually worsening. The bottom line is that with continued excessive

subsidization of gasoline and energy, sustainable development cannot be reached.

In Venezuela, the public has not been as vocal about demanding policies that are

sustainable from an ecological point of view for primarily two reasons. Firstly, concerns

for the environment would lead to the end of gasoline and energy subsidization, which

many have become dependent on. Secondly, it appears that large parts of the Venezuelan

people are more concerned with implementing Chavez's Socialist Revolution as a
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political ambition, while others are more interested in finding ways to reduce Chavez's

power. In addition, Venezuela lacks powerful interests groups like the Landless Workers'

Movement in Brazil to lobby the government, and since only a portion of the Amazon

rainforest is within its borders, there is less international pressure to convince the

government to introduce measures to protect the environment. The populist Chavez is

especially responsive to his constituency but if the people do not demand policies that are

sustainable from an ecological point of view, sustainable development policies are less

likely to occur. In Venezuela, where the majority of the people live in urban areas, people

are not as directly dependent on the environment for their survival. With the

government's focus on reviving the rural areas this may change, and public demands for

environmental sustainability may change with it.

In conclusion

If a leftist populist leader is faced with public demands that can be overcome by

short-term unsustainable solutions from an ecological point of view, then the leader will

sacrifice the long-term goals of sustainable development. This hypothesis holds true to a

certain extent since such leaders are indeed responsive to public demands. By simply

looking at the leaders ideological values, it could be assumed that leftist leaders have a

greater propensity to listen to the marginalized in society, to emphasize social welfare

programs and egalitarian societal structures, whereas conservative governments are more

inclined to favor corporate interests as part of their support for market economies. In this

respect, leftist leaders would be more prone to implement sustainable development

policies. A leader with populist tendencies is very receptive to the people that brought
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them to power and as a result the types of public demands determine whether the leader

will choose long-term or short-term policies and whether these policies are sustainable

from an ecological point of view. Where the public demands ecologically sustainable

policies, a populist leader is likely to prioritize the environment. If the constituency does

not specifically make such demands heard, the government will not place ecological

sustainability on top of the agenda.

In order establish the exact relationship between political orientation and the

implementation of sustainable development policies more extensive analysis is needed

that also include case studies of conservative leaders. In the case studies analyzed here

there are so many additional factors that affect a leader's propensity to implement

sustainable development policies. For now, it can be fair to conclude that leftist leaders

have the value base to embrace sustainable development but without the necessary

political will the actual execution for such policies may be lacking. The main determinant

of whether a leader will implement sustainable development policies is linked to the

preference of public demand. Chavez has been less successful than Lula in implementing

sustainable development policies, mainly because the public demands and international

pressure have not been as prevalent as in Brazil. By raising awareness on the issue of

whether a leader's political orientation is affecting his propensity to implement

sustainable development policies, while highlighting the political, economic and social

constraints that could hinder him in doing so; decision makers may be inspired to try and

find alternative and innovative ways of overcoming these constraints. That way

sustainable development could be successful.
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